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The Role of Modern Audio-Visual Media in the 
Construction of Iranian National Identity 
Abstract: This paper sheds light on a less explored aspect of the modern con-
struction of Iranian national identity. It investigates the role of modern audio-
visual media including cinema, radio and television in this modern construc-
tion. Although the study of Iranian national identity has developed well beyond 
the orthodox romantic nationalist approach dominant during the 20th century, 
not enough attention has been given to the study of modern audio-visual me-
dia. While the printing press had an important role in the construction of what 
Benedict Anderson calls an ‘imagined community’ of Iranians, it was the emer-
gence of cinema, radio and television that crucially contributed to the spread 
of the Persian language as the national language of Iranians. I also argue that 
these media were essential in the propagation of the nationalist ideology of the 
Pahlavi dynasty. Another widely overlooked area in Iranian media studies is the 
importance of the 1979 Revolution in further popularization of audio-visual 
media. I investigate recently published data from research conducted in 1974 
in order to show that despite the availability of these media, many Iranians re-
frained from using them, mainly due to religious reasons. The 1979 Revolution 
and the subsequent Islamization of the audio-visual media, however, changed 
this dynamic and accelerated the popularization of these media even among 
the hardliner religious population. This contributed to further construction of 
an Iranian national identity. 
Keywords: Iranian national identity; nationalism; audio-visual media; cinema; 
radio; television; Pahlavi dynasty; the Islamic Republic; the Iranian Revolution; 
20th century 
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In this paper, I intend to trace the modern construction of Iranian national iden-
tity from the perspective of media studies and more specifically film and tele-
vision studies. I explore the role of modern audio-visual media, including cin-
ema, radio and television, in the construction of Iranian national identity. In 
doing so, I have divided the paper into two main parts consisting of three sub-
sections. The first main part deals with ongoing academic discussions in the 
fields of media studies and the construction of national identity in Iran. In the 
second, analytical part, I present a recently published study about media con-
sumption in late Pahlavi Iran from whose findings I draw my conclusion. 
In the first sub-section, following Benedict Anderson’s theory of nations as 
‘imagined communities’1 I discuss the rise of the printing press in Iran and its 
role in the spread of the Persian language in late 19th and early 20th century. I 
argue that although important in creating the idea of Iran, Persian publications 
remained unreadable for the illiterate majority of the population. A full review 
of national identity studies of Iran is beyond the scope of the paper, however, 
in the context of Anderson’s work, there are other media crucial to the devel-
opment of identity which have not been considered enough. I extend Ander-
son’s theory in order to discuss the emergence of modern audio-visual media, 
including cinema, radio and television in the 20th century as a major catalyst 
in the construction of Iranian national identity. During the Pahlavi dynasty 
(1925–1979), cinema, radio and television proved critical in the dissemination 
of the Persian language as the national language as well as propagation of the 
nationalist ideology of the newly emerging nation-state. I discuss the specific 
role of each of these three media (cinema, radio, television) and offer a brief 
case study of the first Iranian sound film, The Lur Girl (1934), which included 
an authoritarian nationalist message.  
In the second section I reflect on different arguments concerning the ques-
tion of Iranian national identity. A comprehensive review of identity studies 
and nationalism in Iran is beyond the scope of this study; however, I reflect on 
some of the notable developments in order to pinpoint the specific area in the 
academic study of Iranian national identity on which I put the focus of my ar-
gument and also in order to make clear the lines of thought and methodologies 
that have influenced my own study. I discuss Anderson’s theory2 and accord-
ingly, the modernization approach in the study of Iranian national identity. I 
                                                 
1  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso Books, 2006). 
2  Ibid. 
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contend that the investigation of modern audio-visual media and their role in 
the construction of Iranian national identity remains a lacuna in the field.  
In the second part (my third section), I focus on recently published research 
conducted by ʿAlī Asadī and Majī d Tehra nī ya n in 1974.3 Using detailed statis-
tics, I provide an analysis of the popularity and the reach of these media in Iran 
during the Pahlavi dynasty up to the 1979 Revolution. I show that due to sev-
eral obstacles, including religious opposition, these media did not reach the 
peak of their popularization until after the 1979 Revolution. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, I suggest the revolution and the subsequent Islamization of these me-
dia resulted in their further popularization, making them essential tools in the 
construction of Iranian national identity.  
While taking into account the political ideology of both the Pahlavi dynasty 
and the Islamic Republic, I have tried to take the argument beyond mere 
rhetoric and focus on a continuous process of the construction of Iranian na-
tional identity and the crucial role of the audio-visual media during both periods.  
 
 
Part 1: Public Media and the Nation-State 
 
In his book Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na-
tionalism, Anderson argues that the modern emergence of the nation as an idea 
is associated with the invention of the printing press and rise of print capital-
ism.4 He argues that in order to maximize profit, capitalist entrepreneurs pre-
ferred to publish books in vernacular languages (instead of exclusive languages 
such as Latin). When people who spoke various dialects of that language be-
came able to read the same books and papers which were previously published 
in limited numbers, a sense of unity was created inside groups of people who 
didn’t necessarily know each other. This opportunity was used by elites in or-
der to produce the feeling among the readers that they shared a set of interests. 
This feeling was then used towards the creation of a sense of nationalism that 
gave birth to the nation state. Through this analysis, Anderson refers to the na-
tion as an “imagined community” which in his words is deeply rooted in “reli-
gious communities” and “dynastic realms”.5 This understanding of the nation 
is particularly significant for the study of Iranian national identity for the im-
portance that it gives to modern media and their role in spreading vernacular 
                                                 
3  ʿAlī Asadī and Majī d Tehra nī ya n, Ṣidāyī ki shinīdih nashud: nigarishhā-yi ijtimāʿī-farhangī va 
tūsiʿih-yi nāmutivāzin dar Īrān (A Voice That Was Not Heard: Socio-Cultural Attitudes and Un-
even Development in Iran) (Tehran: Nashrinī , 2017). 
4  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 44. 
5  Ibid., 12. 
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languages towards the construction of nations and also for the link that it es-
tablishes between the nation and its political power.  
In Iran, publishing houses and publications such as books, newspaper, and 
magazines first emerged during the 19th century under the Qajar dynasty 
(1785–1925) and continued to flourish into the 20th century. Although these 
publications were fundamental in the formation of the idea of Iran as a nation-
state, they remained unreadable to the illiterate masses. This dynamic changed 
in the 20th century with the introduction of modern audio-visual media, in-
cluding cinema, radio and television. These media were capable of communi-
cating with a much larger section of the population regardless of their level of 
literacy and thus, played a significant role in propagation of the Persian lan-
guage as a unifying factor in the construction of Iranian national identity. The 
emergence of cinema, in particular, coincided with Riz a  Sha h’s nation-state 
building program (1921 and 1941).  
As pointed out by Afshin Marashi, the Riz a  Sha h period was the first politi-
cal era in Iranian history in which the state self-consciously used nationalism 
as its ideology.6 Riz a  Sha h’s implementation of authoritarian nationalist poli-
tics in Iran involved military force and heavy oppression of the opposition but 
also included other means of propagation of his nationalist ideology. In addi-
tion to print publications, he also recognized at an early stage the great poten-
tial of the new medium of cinema. His son, Muh ammad Riz a  Sha h, added radio 
and television to the list of media utilized in this ideological campaign. Cinema, 
radio and television all became crucial in maintaining the hegemony of the 
state. Modern audio-visual media, not only important in creating a sense of 
shared identity through Persian language, also served as essential tools for 
propagating the nationalist ideology of the Pahlavis.7  
 
Cinema 
Cinema appeared in Iran first in 1900. That year the French Catholic mission 
opened the first public cinema, Soleil Cinema, in Tabriz. The first commercial 
cinema in Iran opened its door to the public in 1904 in Chira gh-Ga z Avenue in 
Tehran, showing trick films, comedies, and newsreels from the Transvaal War 
in South Africa.8 Its founder, Mī rza  Ibra hī m Kha n S ah a fba shī , was a modern ed-
ucated constitutionalist who, after travelling the world, returned to Iran with a 
                                                 
6  Afshin Marashi, Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940 (Seattle, WA: Uni-
versity of Washington Press, 2008). 
7  Hamid Reza Sadr, Iranian Cinema: A Political History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006). 
8  Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema. Vol. 1. 4 vols. (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2011), 57.  
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film projector. His early endeavor to establish a movie theater in Tehran, how-
ever, was foiled. Only a month after opening his cinema, S ah a fba shī was forced 
to shut it down due to religious outrage.9 The main argument of the clergy and 
traditionalists who opposed the introduction of this new medium was that it 
was morally corrupt (and corrupting) and against Islamic doctrine, which ob-
jected to figurative representations.10 Despite the religious opposition, cinema 
was not going to go away; after all, the modernists saw cinema as an interesting 
modern means of communication. Several film theaters sprung up during the 
turbulent years of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) and the years 
after. Another well-travelled modernist pioneer of cinema was the Iranian Ar-
menian A rda shis Ba dma grya n (1863–1928), known as Ardashī r Kha n. After 
opening a cinema in his own apartment in Tehran in 1909, Ardashī r Kha n set 
out to open an actual film theater in 1915. He named his eighty-seat public cin-
ema Tajaddud meaning modernity.11 This modernist fascination with cinema 
eventually found its way into Riz a  Sha h’s authoritarian modernization project. 
Inheriting a society with an illiteracy rate of over 80 percent,12 Riz a  Sha h un-
derstood cinema as a means of mass communication. Under his rule, new the-
aters were opened across Iran in order to show foreign films. These films typi-
cally opened with scenes of Riz a  Sha h’s modernization campaign, showing the 
inauguration of the telegraph and railway industries, the construction of new 
bridges, roads and highways, and military marches. These images were accom-
panied by the national anthem while the audience was expected to stand to 
attention.13 
By 1930 there were up to thirty-three film theaters across Iran and this 
number continued to grow. In that year Uva nis Uha nya n (1896–1960) estab-
lished the first film school under the title of Parvarishgāh-i Ārtīstī-yi Sīnamā 
(The Artistic Film School) and released the first Iranian film, a silent comedy 
named Ābī ū Rabī (Abi and Rabi). 
The most iconic example of Riz a  Sha h’s incorporation of cinema in his na-
tion-state building campaign is Dukhtar-i Lur (The Lur Girl), the first Iranian 
talkie which was released in 1934. The film was produced in Persian in Bom-
bay, India under the Imperial Film Company, where making a sound film was 
possible. The idea for the film was initiated by ʿAbd al-H usayn Sipanta  (1907–
1969), a pro-Riz a  Sha h modernist and nationalist Iranian who wrote the script 
                                                 
9  Naficy, A Social History. 
10  Nacim Pak-Shiraz, Shi’i Islam in Iranian Cinema: Religion and Spirituality in Film (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2011), 41. 
11  Naficy, A Social History, 67. 
12  Sadr, Iranian Cinema, 13. 
13  Ibid., 19. 
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and turned it into a film with the aid of Ardashī r I ra nī (1886–1969), an Indian 
Parsi. Dukhtar-i Lur is an outright propagator of Riz a  Sha h’s authoritarian cam-
paign of nation-state building. The ideological approach of the film is evident 
even in its alternative title Iran: Yesterday, Today, which appeared on the 
posters. The story of the film takes place mainly in the Lur inhabited part of 
Southwest Iran. The Lurs in this area had shown fierce resistance against Riz a  
Sha h’s national unification campaign. Tribal and nomadic forces had fought 
bloody battles against Riz a  Sha h’s military which eventually led to their defeat 
and subjugation and the consolidation of centralized power.14  
The film begins with an explanatory text on the screen: “Before the auspi-
cious era of Pahlavi, when South and West of Iran were under the influence of 
various tribal and nomadic forces (īlāt va ʿashāyir-i mukhtalif)”. The first se-
quence of the film is dedicated to introducing Gulna r who was kidnapped as a 
child by bandits and was taken to Luristan where she was held in a teahouse as 
an entertainer. Jaʿfar (played by Sipanta  himself) is a government agent who is 
sent to the Lur inhabited part of the country to deal with the problem of ban-
dits. He is fully clothed in Western dress and has an air of power and wisdom 
unlike the people around Gulna r, who are depicted as backward savages. The 
two characters meet and fall in love. Jaʿfar helps Gulna r escape her captors. Af-
ter a series of clashes and after Jaʿfar kills several bandits including their leader, 
they manage to flee. Fearing the revenge of the bandits, they escape to Mumbai.  
After their arrival in Mumbai, the film is interrupted by a series of interti-
tles. The intertitles inform the audience that years passed, Riz a  Sha h seized 
power, and happiness overtook Iran. Then, on a background of the national flag, 
the new government’s ‘achievements’ are noted one after another: ‘Economic 
development’, ‘construction of factories’, ‘unified dress code’, ‘protection of 
women’s rights’, etc. The screen is then filled with three lines of text reading: 
“All of this progress has taken place just in a few years and as a result of con-
siderations of the great Shāhanshāh (King of Kings) of Iran” which then cuts to 
another three lines: “This progress not only created comfort inside Iran but was 
also a cause for pride for all Iranians abroad”. In his 2006 book, Iranian Cinema: 
A Political History, Hamid Reza Sadr claims that these intertitles were sug-
gested by the state “to make clear that the lawlessness it depicted took place 
during the reign of the previous dynasty”.15 The last sequence of the film shows 
the now unveiled and ‘modernized’ Gulna r playing piano under a framed pic-
ture of Riz a  Sha h on the wall while Jaʿfar sings a Nationalist pro-Pahlavi song. 
In the end, during a dialogue between Jaʿfar and Gulna r, Jaʿfar declares that the 
                                                 
14  Stephanie Cronin, Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921–1941 (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 26. 
15  Sadr, Iranian Cinema, 32.  
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“fatherland” is now “blessed” and is full of “happiness” and that they should go 
back to Iran. The film concludes with an image of Riz a  Sha h.  
As Sadr argues, Dukhtar-i Lur has a colonial adventurer narrative with an 
Orientalist approach.16 This is evident in the role of Jaʿfar as the Westernized 
male savior of the female victim trapped in a backward society. After rescuing 
his ‘damsel in distress’, the hero introduces her to Western culture and ‘moder-
nity’, presumably as a metaphor for what Riz a  Sha h did to Iran. The similarity 
between Jaʿfar’s outfit and that of Riz a  Sha h is not a coincidence. Like Jaʿfar, 
Riz a  Sha h also set out to ‘save’ Iran from ‘backwardness’ and ‘savagery’ and in 
order to do so he did not hesitate to kill his enemies. The savages in the film 
were in reality tribal and nomadic Lurs who resisted Riz a  Sha h’s national uni-
fication and forced sedentarization campaign. In case their military defeat was 
not enough for their complete subjugation, they were now demonized in the 
first Iranian sound film. So, Iranians who for the first time went to cinemas to 
watch an Iranian sound film, were subjected to a fictionalized version of their 
government’s authoritarian national identity building project. It is worth not-
ing that as a result of making the film in India and using Indian actors, most of 
the characters when speaking Persian had Indian accents. Also, the character 
of Gulna r who was introduced in the film as a Lur was played by Ru h angī z 
Samī ʿ nizha d (1916–1997) who was from Bam in Kerman province and had 
Kermani accent. Jaʿfar however (who was played by Sipanta  himself), spoke 
Persian with a Tehrani accent. So, while introducing the Persian language as 
the language of the nation, the film also introduced a specific accent of that lan-
guage as the accent of power, wisdom, and progress. The Lur people weren’t 
only demonized in appearance and deeds but were also stripped of their Luri 
language and were made to speak Persian in non-native accents in the film.  
The importance of cinema for Riz a  Sha h’s administration is also clear in its 
approach towards another film with Lur tribes at its center. However, where 
Dukhtar-i Lur was favored by the central administration, the other was very 
much disliked and banned: a documentary film titled Grass: A Nation’s Battle 
for Life (1925). The filmmakers, Merian C. Cooper (1893–1973) and Ernest B. 
Schoedsack (1893–1979), were the same duo who went on to produce King 
Kong in 1933. The colonial adventurer eye that led to the making of King Kong 
is very much present also in Grass: A Nation’s Battle for Life. The film follows a 
branch of the Bakhtiari tribe of Lurs as they and their herds make their sea-
sonal migration. They endure such hardships as crossing the Karun River and 
trekking the Zard-Kuh, the highest peak (4,221 m) in the Zagros Mountains. 
The filmmakers depict their own journey from Angora (modern day Ankara, 
Turkey) to the land of the Bakhtiaris as a journey through history; a journey to 
                                                 
16  Sadr, Iranian Cinema, 29. 
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find what they call ‘the forgotten people’. The film then depicts these ‘forgotten’ 
people’s culture as a primitive way of life, preserved in time in a primitive East-
ern part of the world. This of course did not sit well with Riz a  Sha h’s modern-
ization campaign and the image he tried to present of Iran and Iranians. As a 
result of this conflict, the film was banned from Iranian cinemas. It was only 
after Riz a  Sha h’s abdication and during his son’s reign, in 1964, that Grass: A 
Nation’s Battle for Life was finally shown in Iran, albeit with additional com-
mentary added in order to alleviate its negative impact.17 
Theoretically speaking cinema was accessible for people regardless of their 
level of literacy, and thus could communicate with a larger portion of the pop-
ulation. In practice, however, there existed several obstacles. A lack of infra-
structure was one significant obstacle but also the fact that the clergy and tra-
ditionalists remained critical of the new medium limited its proliferation. Na-
cim Pak-Shiraz argues that their criticism wasn’t only due to the ‘corrupt’ 
Western content of the films being shown but also because by “creating a space 
for mixed-sex entertainment, cinema also created a dangerous new ‘unislamic’ 
leisure ritual”.18 This is particularly important because many religious rituals 
had been suppressed under Riz a  Sha h and cinema seemed to offer an 
alternative.  
Despite this conflicting relationship, the popularity of cinema gradually 
grew, making it an important source of communication. Rapid industrialization 
and the adoption of capitalist modes of production resulted in the establish-
ment of increasingly more cinema venues, film production companies and also 
a boost in the urban population.19 The first volume of Jama l Umī d’s book 
Farhang-i fīlmhā-yi sīnimā-yi Īrān (Encyclopaedia of Iranian Films)20 provides 
us with detailed information regarding films made in the early years of Iranian 
cinema. A close examination reveals that in regard to Persian-language film 
production, between 1930 and 1936 a rate of at least one film per year was 
made, but by 1953 more than ten films per year were being produced, and this 
number continued to grow. This did not even include the foreign films which 
were dubbed in Persian and widely distributed as well. 
The Allied Forces’ occupation of Iran in 1941 which had led to the abdica-
tion of Riz a  Sha h, had also allowed for a development of a lively free press. The 
number of newspapers, magazines, and other publications continued to grow 
during and after the war. This growing number of publications, together with 
                                                 
17  Sadr, Iranian Cinema, 20. 
18  Pak-Shiraz, Shi’i Islam in Iranian Cinema, 41. 
19  Naficy, A Social History, 10. 
20  Jama l Umī d, Farhang-i fīlmhā-yi sīnimā-yi Īrān (Encyclopaedia of Iranian Films). Vol. 1. 4 vols. 
(Tehran: Niga h, 2010). 
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cinema in the form of both dubbed foreign films and Iranian films, played a sig-
nificant role in the spread of the Persian language as a unifying force. In this 
way, the emergence of what Anderson calls ‘Print Capitalism’ along with the 
rise of cinema as a capitalist endeavor with state guidance supported the con-
struction of the ‘imagined community’21 of ‘Iranians’. However, it must be noted 
that even in the early 1950s when some of the daily political publications had 
a circulation of 50,000, the majority of the population remained outside their 
sphere of influence due to the high illiteracy rate of 80 percent.22 While dissem-
ination of these ideas could have also occurred through word of mouth, with 
such a high illiteracy rate, it must be questioned how influential these publica-
tions really were throughout Iran. Moreover, as discussed previously, a signifi-
cant portion of society refused to go to cinemas due to their religious beliefs. 
Therefore, the introduction of radio with its greater accessibility to all came to 
be an important medium in the construction of Iranian national identity.  
 
Radio 
Emergence of radio in Iran is linked to Nazi Germany’s special interest in the 
country and their attempts to spread Aryan national ideology among Iranians. 
The Aryan national ideology which became an important component of the 
Pahlavis’ nation-state building project had found its way into Iranian political 
debates among the elites and intellectuals in the late 19th century; however, a 
significant event that helped boost this ideology amongst a broader number of 
Iranians was Nazi Germany’s interest in Iran and especially their presence in 
the country during Riz a  Sha h’s reign. Matthias Ku ntzel discusses the special 
relationship between Iran and Germany and the role of the Nazi movement in 
the development of Aryan ideology among the larger Iranian public.23 He 
presents evidence that since the late 19th century and especially after the rise 
to the throne of Wilhelm II (1859–1941) in 1888, the Germans had shown a 
special interest in the Islamic world. This was due to their competition with 
other European powers, whose influence in the East they wished to restrain. 
Ku ntzel argues that this special interest and attempt to develop a relationship 
                                                 
21  Anderson, Imagined Communities.  
22  Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution: Communi-
cation, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1994), 55. 
23  Matthias Ku ntzel, Ālmānī-hā va Īrān: Tārīkh-i guẕashtih va muʿāsir-i yik dūsti-yi badfarjām (The 
Germans and Iran: History and Present of a Fateful Friendship), trans. Michael Mobasheri 
(Paris and Cologne: Editions Khavaran and Forough Publishing, 2017), https://rangin-kaman. 
 net/wp-content/uploads/images/post/ald.pdf. 
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entered a new phase during the rule of the Nazi Party.24 Unlike Britain and Rus-
sia, Germany was not involved in colonial and imperial politics in Iran and thus 
didn’t have that negative implication of a foreign invasive power for Iranians. 
Moreover, Nazi Germany played a crucial role in the industrialization of Iran 
during Riz a  Sha h’s regime. This all helped to establish a friendly image of Ger-
many for Iranians. 
When it came to making an ally in the East, the Nazi propaganda machine 
led by Joseph Goebbels made good use of the Aryan ideology. One important 
channel through which they publicized this ideology was the Persian-language 
Radio Berlin broadcasts that started in 1938; the first Persian radio to be heard 
by Iranians was dedicated to an Aryan ideology that declared Iranians to be of 
the same race as their German ‘brothers’.25 
Ku ntzel draws upon reports from the German ambassador that suggests 
during World War II Germans were favored by many Iranians, including the 
clergy. This support for Germany was extended to many Shi’a clerics claiming 
that Hitler was a descendent of the prophet Muh ammad; some even declared 
that Hitler was in fact the Hidden Imam (the Twelfth Imam, Muh ammad 
al-Mahdī ) of the Shi’as who had finally emerged to revive Islam.26 In their radio 
program, the Nazis accompanied their analysis with verses from the Quran. For 
instance, in order to advocate their anti-Jewish policies, they used Quranic 
verses in regard to Muh ammad’s campaigns against the Jewish tribes who lived 
in Arabia.27  
The Allied Forces’ occupation of Iran in 1941 and the subsequent abdication 
of Riz a  Sha h put an end to the special relationship between Iran and Germany; 
however, the influence of the Nazi ideological campaign was to last for decades 
to come. A true son of his father, the new monarch, Muh ammad Riz a  Sha h con-
tinued the campaign of national identity building. His ideological approach is 
signified by the fact that after the Second World War he appointed Bahra m 
Sha hrukh (presenter and head of Radio Berlin in Persian) to the post of direc-
tor of news and propaganda.28  
The state-controlled Radio Iran was inaugurated on April 24th, 1940, two 
years after Radio Berlin started its Persian broadcasts. The date was symboli-
cally chosen as it was the crown prince’s twenty first birthday. The first broad-
cast which lasted for four hours from 7pm to 11pm, started with the Iranian 
                                                 
24  Ku ntzel, Ālmānī-hā va Īrān, 34. 
25  Ibid., 47. 
26  Ibid., 41. 
27  Ibid., 43. 
28  Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016), 160. 
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national anthem. After the crown prince enacted the necessary formalities, the 
prime minister, Ah mad Matī n-Daftarī (1897–1971) read a short message out-
lining the benefits of radio for the general public and that listening centers 
would be set up where people could listen to radio for free.29 The press took 
notice of this historic event: The newspaper Iṭṭilāʿāt published a piece describ-
ing radio as “one of the most important human inventions […] among the most 
valuable gifts of civilization and progress” that could be considered “the voice 
of a nation heard in different parts of the world […] and can be used as an ele-
ment in strengthening the unity of a nation”.30 In an interview published in his 
semi-autobiography, Umīd va āzādī (Hope and Freedom), I raj Gurgī n, a promi-
nent producer, reporter, and news anchor for Radio Iran stated: 
 
From its foundation until many years later, radio in Iran was considered a section of 
the General Bureau of Propaganda and Publication, and a state broadcasting insti-
tute whose task was propaganda, not necessarily according to journalistic eti-
quettes.31  
 
This policy continued under the second Pahlavi ruler. The anchor was in-
structed to start every program with the latest news on the “Shāhanshāh 
Āryāmihr” (King of Kings, Light of the Aryans).32  
On December 29th, 1940, eight months after the first broadcast of Radio 
Iran, BBC Radio also started Persian-language broadcasts, and in the 1960s Ra-
dio Tehran was added to the state-controlled radio, with more entertainment 
programs gradually being included in their broadcasts.33 Compared to cinema 
and the press, radio managed to penetrate deeper into the public and to engage 
a larger part of the population. According to a UNESCO report, by 1940 20,000 
radio sets existed in Iran; a decade later this number rose to 60,000, roughly 
one set per 300 people.34 
 
Television 
The 1953 coup was followed by years of political oppression and economic 
growth. With the resumption of oil revenues, government money started to 
flow again, and an atmosphere of entrepreneurship and capitalist competition 
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took over.35 Among these entrepreneurs was H abī bulla h Sa bit, who acquired 
state permission to establish the first television station in Iran. As a result, 
while radio in Iran started as a state-controlled means of ideological domi-
nance, television (at least at its beginning) took a different route and was 
founded as a private business. As well as establishing the television station, 
Sa bit imported and sold television receivers, while also selling advertisement 
airtime to local entrepreneurs. The Television of Iran was inaugurated in Octo-
ber 1958 with a speech by Mohammad Riz a  Sha h.36 
Following the success of Sa bit’s Television of Iran, the government set out to 
establish its own state-run television station. On October 26th 1966, National 
Iranian Television sent out its first broadcast, a message from Muh ammad Riz a  
Sha h. Complete programs started on Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, in March 
1967. In July 1969, Sa bit’s Television of Iran was taken over by the state, after 
which television became a state-run organization. In 1971 National Iranian 
Television was merged with the thirty-five-year-old radio network and Na-
tional Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT) was born as a public broadcast mo-
nopoly operating as an independent government corporation.37 
Comparatively, television broadcasts reached a considerably smaller part of 
the population than those of radio (mainly the emerging middle and upper 
class), but it did continue to grow. By 1979, NIRT had about 9,000 employees. 
NIRT was heavily incorporated in the state’s political campaigns, so much that 
according to Gurgī n:  
 
In regard to what was called matters of national security, especially after the emer-
gence of urban guerrilla movement and a rise of armed clashes, and also in the crit-
ical period prior to the revolution, NIRT didn’t have anything to say; it was infor-
mation and security authorities of the country that were the references and pro-
vided the content of reports in regard to these matters.38  
 
Moreover, due to its visual qualities, television was considered a significant 
medium in propagation of the Pahlavi’s national ideology. It was through this 
new medium that in October 1971 the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Em-
pire was broadcasted live for both national and international audiences. Mon-
archs and heads of state were invited from around the world to take part in a 
lavish party organized to strengthen Muh ammad Riz a  Sha h’s position both in 
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Iran and also on the world stage, and to introduce him as a true heir to a sup-
posedly continuous Persian monarchy founded by Cyrus II (also known as 
Cyrus the Great). The world, and more significantly Iranians, watched the Shah 
on the first day of the celebrations when he stood in front of the tomb of Cyrus 
and called him “the immortal hero of the history of Iran”, before pledging alle-
giance to him: “Cyrus! […] Sleep in peace, for we are awake! And we always will 
be”.39  
The people of the Shah’s ‘nation’, however, were not allowed anywhere near 
the celebration, which was reserved for the domestic elite, foreign monarchs 
and heads of state. Instead, they were to hear about it only on the radio or 
television.  
 
Iranian National Identity: A Contested Idea 
A comprehensive discussion on all aspects of the study of Iranian national iden-
tity is beyond the scope of this paper; however, by briefly reviewing some of 
the main trends as well as influential scholarly arguments, I aim to make it clear 
as to where and how my own approach fits into this study. The academic study 
of Iranian national identity in the field of Iranian studies was until recently 
dominated by an arguably primordialist, romantic and nationalist approach. 
For instance, in his 1982 book, Huvīyat-i Īrānī va zabān-i Fārsī (Iranian Identity 
and the Persian Language), Sha hrukh Misku b claims that “of course, in previ-
ous ages also, we were a nation with our own specific identity, and had an idea 
of Iran and Iranian”.40 Even as late as 1993, such claims were being made by 
leading scholars of Iranian studies such as Ehsan Yarshater, who declared that 
“Iranian identity is clearly asserted in the inscriptions of Darius the Great (522–
486 BC), who as an Aryan and a Persian was fully conscious of his racial affili-
ation and proud of his national identity”.41  
In this classic or orthodox approach, the ‘nation of Iran’ and ‘Iranian iden-
tity’ are considered natural, homogenous, and continuous elements in history. 
Persian ethnicity is at the core of this notion of Iranian identity and the Persian 
language is recognized as the carrier and savior of this identity even through 
such challenges as the Arab invasion that ended the Sassanian Empire in 651. 
There is also a special emphasis put on the ‘Aryan’ racial aspect of Iranian iden-
tity. Furthermore, Zoroastrianism is considered to have had been the original 
national religion of Iranians and Persians, before the foreign imposition of Islam 
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by the invading Arabs. It is also argued that Persians modified Islam to make it 
fit their own identity.42  
The most radical opposition to the orthodox primordialist approach came 
in 1993 with the publication of Mostafa Vaziri’s book Iran as Imagined Nation.43 
Only three years after Anderson’s seminal work Imagined Communities, Vaziri 
took a similar approach in his analysis with regard to the construction of ‘the 
nation of Iran’ and Iranian national identity. He aimed to challenge what he 
summarized as “the dominant nationalist historiography which had anachro-
nistically conceptualized and traced Iranian national identity to the remote 
past”.44  
By taking a ‘modernization approach’, Vaziri considered ‘Iran’ and ‘Iranian 
identity’ modern constructs. The core idea of his book was the importance he 
gave to the works of 19th century European Orientalists, who studied the ‘Ori-
ent’ and as he claimed, came up with the ideas of ‘Iran’ and ‘Iranians’ as a coun-
try and its people. He argued that the beginning of this formal study of Iran can 
be tied to two events at the end of the 18th century: first, the discovery of the 
Indo-European language family and subsequently the idea of the ‘Aryan peo-
ple’; and second, the competition between the two imperial powers of France 
and England over parts of Asia. While England controlled much of what is today 
India, Napoleon I became interested in both India and the region to its west: 
Iran.45 Vaziri argued that in studying the people of this region, both past and 
present, the Orientalists used a nationalist methodology to categorize diverse 
populations. This methodology, he believed “may have been inevitable and 
even, to a certain degree, natural after Europe had gone through the historical 
experiences that led to the formation of national identities in a narrow 
context”.46 By taking this methodology and under the influence of the Aryan 
model, they applied such modern concepts as race and national identity to 
communities of the remote past whose perceptions were conditioned by non-
modern ideas. The eventual result of such an approach, as Vaziri points out, 
was the Orientalist belief in “homogeneity and the Iranianness of communities 
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who lived in the land of Iran in different historical periods”.47 Vaziri then argued 
that this approach was followed by the Iranian nationalist thinkers of the late 
19th century onwards, who worked towards modernizing, democratizing and 
secularizing the country they were helping to create.48 
There were also other scholars who, to varying degrees, challenged the or-
thodox view on Iranian identity. Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi, although critical 
of Vaziri’s book, also took a revisionist viewpoint. He claimed that Vaziri’s ap-
proach in considering the national historiography a “product of European colo-
nialism” to be an ‘Orientalist’ approach itself.49 Tavakoli-Targhi instead empha-
sized the role of late 19th century Iranian intellectuals themselves. He argued 
that the crafting of a modern Iranian identity was linked to the efforts of these 
intellectuals towards the configuration of history and a re-styling of language. 
He showed how certain terms such as kishvar, millat and Īrān, which already 
existed in Persian, were “rearticulated” in their texts in order to express new 
modern meanings of ‘country’, ‘nation’ and ‘Iran’ (in its modern national 
sense). For instance, he presented evidence on the evolution of the term vaṭan 
(homeland) from referring to one’s village or town to signifying ‘motherland’ 
in a national sense. He argued that in these texts the history of Iran replaced 
the history of Islam, and that the forgotten pre-Islamic past was described as a 
utopia. In this reconfigured history, Islam and the Arabs were blamed for Iran’s 
backwardness and in order to regain the glory of the past, these historians 
looked to the ‘cultured west’; to the culture that they believed was originally 
Iranian.50  
In his recently published book The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race 
and The Politics of Dislocation,51 while acknowledging the significance of both 
Vaziri and Tavakoli-Targhi’s studies, Reza Zia-Ebrahimi presents his alternative 
argument starting with a critique of the two scholars: 
 
Where Vaziri attributes the conceptual framework and narratives of Iranian nation-
alism to European orientalists alone, Tavakoli-Targhi keeps them squarely within 
the Persianate domain, seeing the origin of many nationalist myths in local sources 
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exclusively. Vaziri rejects the agency of Iranians themselves (beyond their mere ‘im-
itation’) while Tavakoli-Targhi refutes any claim that European models could have 
been used to reimagine the Iranian nation.52  
 
Zia-Ebrahimi presents evidence on the claim that specific nationalist ideas that 
emerged in late 19th century Iran, were first expressed by European authors 
rather than in any local tradition. However, he argues that it was Iranian 
thinkers who “hybridized” these ideas into the Iranian nationalist ideology. He 
conducts detailed research to show the complexity of the process through 
which particular ideas were selected at the expense of others.53 
The above-mentioned scholars presented a new outlook into the study of 
Iranian national identity. But they remained preoccupied with Persian publica-
tions of the late 19th century in order to show how the idea of Iran and Iranian 
identity was crafted in the works of Iranian and non-Iranian intellectuals of 
that period. Like Anderson, they place much importance on the emergence of 
the printing press and publishing houses, but they rarely consider the larger 
implications of this new medium for the propagation of the Persian language. 
Instead, they mostly focus on the content of those publications. Accordingly, 
they rarely investigate the specific role of modern audio-visual media in the 
propagation of the Persian language as well as the concept of Iran as a nation 
amongst everyday people. 
 
 
Part 2: 1979 – A Revolution in Media 
 
I have built my argument in this paper on the basis of other scholars in the field 
who took a modernization approach towards the much-debated topic of 
Iranian national identity. However, I have tried to further their arguments by 
incorporating modern audio-visual media. The 1979 Revolution presents a sig-
nificant moment in the modern construction of Iranian national identity. 
A recently published study conducted by Asadī and Tehra nī ya n in 1974 pro-
vides us with detailed statistical data on the use of public media and cultural 
habits in pre-revolution Iran.54 Before proceeding to discuss the findings of this 
research, it is important to reflect on its history and validity of its methods. 
Although the research was conducted in 1974, it took more than 40 years for it 
to be publicly accessible in the form of a book. In their foreword for the book, 
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ʿAbba s ʿAbdī and Muh sin Gu darzī , who are responsible for its recent publica-
tion, discuss the background of the research. They mention the unprecedented 
rise in the oil price during the 1970s which, in their words, resulted in the “il-
lusion that Iran was about to become a world power”.55 This was accompanied 
by a rapid increase in the use of radio and television and a general change in 
the economic structure and social behavior of Iranians. In such a setting a 
group of sociologists and communication specialists got together and decided 
to conduct a series of social forecasting studies (muṭāliʿātī āyandih nigarī). Ac-
cording to their foreword, ʿ Alī Asadī and Majī d Tehra nī ya n were the main mem-
bers of this group. Financial backing of the research was secured via the NIRT 
as one of the main aims of the research was to study how radio and television 
could help in the “development process of the country”.56  
The findings of the research were presented and discussed at a conference 
in Shiraz in 1975. However, they were not made available for the public. ʿAbdī 
and Gu darzī argue that this was perhaps because the findings of the research 
did not fit the image that the authorities had of themselves and the vision they 
had for the society. The findings showed that despite the rapid industrialization 
and expansion of the middle class, religious tendencies were still strong and 
dissatisfaction with radio and television were widespread.57 For ʿAbdī and 
Gu darzī , these findings were indicators of the revolution that took place only 
four years later in 1979. The book consists of the findings of two of the surveys. 
The first is a study of the role of the media in national and cultural development 
with a small statistical population mostly comprising of the educated elite and 
employees of the NIRT.58 The second survey – which is of more interest for this 
paper – has a much larger statistical population designed to represent the na-
tional population. It was titled Girāyishhā-yi farhangī va nigarishhā-yi ijtimāʿī 
dar Īrān (Cultural Tendencies and Social Attitudes in Iran) and was conducted 
as a pilot research in 23 towns and cities and 52 villages in different 
provinces.59 According to the researchers’ introduction to the survey, the sta-
tistical population was chosen carefully to be representative of the adult (over 
fifteen years old) population of the whole of the country. They were chosen ac-
cording to their residential location, gender, age, education, employment and 
income. Twenty-five experienced researchers and 300 interviewers were in-
volved in the research. The survey was conducted simultaneously in every lo-
cation and included 5,000 interviewees (case studies) of which 4,420 were 
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eventually confirmed and were included in the study. According to ʿAbdī and 
Gu darzī , the survey’s documents such as the individual answers to the ques-
tionnaires and the coding method for the open-ended questions have been 
lost.60 However, the questionnaire itself and the results of the survey have re-
mained. The questionnaire included 126 questions with 107 of them being 
closed-ended and the other 19 being open-ended. Each questionnaire was 
filled with the help of an on-location interviewer and lasted for about an hour. 
Questions were designed to cover topics such as radio, television, cinema, 
newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, news sources, leisure time, reli-
gion, family, hopes and ideals, social relations and more. The findings of this 
research shed a light on a less explored aspect of the cultural habits of Iranians 
in the years leading up to the 1979 Revolution.  
According to the findings of the survey, by as late as 1974, only 7% of the 
population relied on newspapers and the press as their source of news. Accord-
ing to UNESCO, in 1976 the Adult literacy rate in Iran was 36.5%.61 This indi-
cates that even two years after the survey was conducted, a large section of the 
population remained outside the readership of publications; however, the wide 
gap between 7% and 36.5% points to the fact that people were relying on other 
sources of news. This can be explained by the growing popularity of radio and 
television. According to the findings of the survey, radio had a much higher 
share than newspapers, at 53%, with television at 21%.62 So, while the reader-
ship of Persian language publications remained very low, the audience of the 
audio-visual means of communication were on the rise. This allowed for radio 
and television (and, on a smaller scale, cinema) to play an important role in 
spreading a single national language and thus contributing to the formation of 
Iranian national identity. However, as discussed previously, the road to popu-
larity for these media was not an easy one. The difficulty was due to many fac-
tors including lack of infrastructure, high cost of individual devices, and reli-
gious opposition. Although the religious opposition was mainly towards 
cinema and television (due to their visual quality and “immoral” content), radio 
was also opposed by some (for example because it broadcast music, which was 
considered by some as anti-Islamic). An interesting account is by Muh ammad 
Java d Z arī f, Iran’s current minister of foreign affairs, born in 1960. In an inter-
view with the daily newspaper Īrān on January 7th 2015, Z arī f recounted that 
while growing up not only did he not go to cinema until he was fifteen, he didn’t 
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have access to either television or radio at home due to his family’s religious 
beliefs. He mentioned that although his father owned a radio, he always kept it 
in a locked closet and only used it during the month of Ramadan to listen to the 
Morning Prayer.63  
According to Asadī and Tehra nī ya n’s research, by 1974, 77% of Iranian 
households had at least one radio,64 while the percentage of households with 
televisions was 34%.65 Among the people who didn’t listen to radio, 21% stated 
that they didn’t listen because they believed listening to radio (especially mu-
sic) was sinful, while 46% said that they didn’t have access to radio.66 The study 
also shows that 85% of television owners watched TV on a daily basis,67 while 
11% of television owners didn’t watch TV because in their view it was sinful.68 
The study also gives an interesting insight into people’s habit of going to the 
cinema. The percentage of cinema goers was even lower at 27%,69 with 23% of 
people refusing to go to the cinema because it was sinful.70  
The study clearly shows that while by 1974 a large portion of the population 
had access to audio-visual public media, a significant part of them refused to 
use these means of communication due to their religious beliefs. The 1979 Rev-
olution, however, resulted in a major change in the attitude of this portion of 
the population towards television, radio and cinema.  
On February 1st 1979, immediately after landing in Tehran upon his return 
from exile in Paris, Ru h ulla h Khumiynī travelled to Bihisht-i Zahra  cemetery to 
meet his followers, who had flocked to the streets to welcome him. In one of 
the most historic speeches in Iranian history, he expressed his opposition to 
the Shah and his reformed administration: “I will hit this government on the 
mouth”.71 He then outlined the future that he envisioned for Iran: “With the 
backing of this nation, I appoint the government”.72 A significant part of this 
speech was dedicated to the public media:  
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Since he was a servant [for the west], this man [the Shah] created centers of corrup-
tion. His television is a center of corruption. His radio is mostly corruption. […] Our 
cinema is a center of corruption. We are not opposed to cinema; we are opposed to 
corruption. We are not opposed to radio; we are opposed to corruption. We are not 
opposed to television; we are opposed to something that is serving the aliens for 
holding back our youth and taking away our human resources. Did we ever oppose 
stages of modernity? [Rhetorical question implying that they are not against moder-
nity] When symbols of modernity entered the East, especially Iran, from Europe, 
instead of being useful, they took us to savagery. Cinema is one of the symbols of 
modernity that should be in the service of the people, in the service of the education 
of the people. But you know that it ruined our youth. The same goes for the other 
symbols. That is why we are opposed to them. They betrayed our country in every 
sense of the word.73 
 
Soon after this speech, Khumiynī ’s followers seized power. The new regime’s 
attitude towards cinema, television and radio followed Khumiynī ’s guidance 
and his belief that “in an Islamic country everything must be Islamic”.74 A pe-
riod of ‘cleansing’ (pāksāzī) and ‘purification’ (tas fīyih) ensued. Many media 
professionals were prosecuted, banned, imprisoned and even executed. Many 
others fled the country along with a vast number of other Iranians who chose 
a life in exile.  
The Islamization of the media had an inevitable consequence: it broke the 
taboo of modern audio-visual media for those sections of the society that due 
to religious reasons did not use them. The revolution ploughed the Iranian land 
to an extent that radio and television became an inseparable part of ‘pious’ 
households that previously refrained from allowing such symbols of ‘corrup-
tion’ to enter them. For them, these media were now channels through which 
they could hear the voice and see the image of their Imam. Cinema venues also 
became a hangout of Islamic revolutionaries. For instance, on its opening night, 
a cinema venue called Shahr-i Qīyām (The City of Uprising) showed a new ‘Is-
lamic’ film titled Sarbāz-i Islām (The Soldier of Islam) in the holy city of Qom. 
As a result of this development, it can be argued that for the first time in history, 
the entirety of the Iranian population was open to the idea of using modern 
audio-visual media.  
The Islamic Republic inherited the Pahlavi nation-state building program 
and continued with many aspects of it, most importantly the heavy incorpora-
tion of modern audio-visual media. The outburst of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–
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1988) was an important moment in the nationalist politics of the Islamic Re-
public and in the construction of Iranian national identity. Radio and television 
took the news of the warfronts to the remotest parts of the country and encour-
aged Iranians to sign up as volunteers in order to fight a common enemy. Cin-
ema also gave birth to a new filmmaking movement officially titled Sīnamā-yi 
difāʿ-i muqaddas (Sacred Defense Cinema) which depicted and supported the 
war effort. The Persian language was at the heart of this campaign. In a country 
where just above half of the population spoke Persian as their mother tongue,75 
the audio-visual war propaganda was mainly in Persian. So, at the time when 
modern audio-visual media reached its most widespread state, its content was 
not only calling for national unity against a foreign enemy but also was contrib-
uting to the further spread of the Persian language and thus helped to create 
the ‘imagined community’ of Iranians. The Persian language, which was an im-
portant factor in the construction of the idea of Iran during the late 19th cen-
tury and later, became a pillar of the national ideology of the Pahlavis and con-
tinued to occupy a significant position under the Islamic Republic. The extent 
to which the new regime valued the Persian language in its audio-visual pro-
ductions is clear in the words of Murtiz a  A vī nī , director of arguably the most 
influential Iranian television war documentary series titled Rivāyat-i fatḥ 
(Chronicle of Triumph, 1986–1988). In an interview published first in 1992 he 
goes as far as placing Persian above Arabic and defends it with a sense of Ira-
nian exceptionalism:  
 
Our language is the language that we arrived at in the 8th century [14th century CE] 
and this Persian language that has flourished in Islam is a language that in fact has 
taken a Shi’i character and is much more beautiful than the current Arabic language. 
Of course, the language of the Quran is a divine language and something heavenly, 
but the language that we arrived at in the 8th century with Saʿdī and H a fiz , is the 





In this paper I aimed to open a new chapter in the study of Iranian national 
identity. Although currently the dominant approach in the field is that Iranian 
national identity is a modern construct, the role of modern audio-visual media 
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in this construction is seldom considered. I based my argument on a number 
of scholarly works in both Persian and English in the field of Iranian Studies as 
well as Anderson’s theory of ‘imagined communities’, all belonging to the mod-
ernization approach towards the study of ‘nations’ and ‘national identities’. 
While acknowledging the role of late 19th century Persian publications in the 
crafting of the idea of Iran and construction of Iranian national identity, I tried 
to focus on the role of the audio-visual media in this construction. In this at-
tempt I benefitted from works of several scholars of Film Studies and Iranian 
Studies as well as historical resources such as speeches, interviews and auto-
biographies. An important argument of this paper regarding the further popu-
larization of modern audio-visual media as a result of the 1979 Revolution be-
came possible after a close study of a recently published book containing the 
findings of a survey conducted in 1974.77 The 1979 Revolution and the subse-
quent Islamization of the audio-visual media made it possible for these media 
to find their way even into homes of the most pious members of the society. In 
a society with low literacy rates, the widespread use of audio-visual media, es-
pecially during the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War, helped to create a sense of 
national identity.  
These media continue to play an important role in the nationalist politics of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and in creating a sense of national unity among 
their domestic audience. A careful study of the current trends of politics in Iran, 
especially considering the state’s involvement in regional wars, should take 
into account the nation-state building project that the Islamic Republic inher-
ited from the Pahlavi dynasty and the essential role of modern audio-visual me-
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